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Abstract—In this paper, ensembles of quasi-cyclic moderate-
density parity-check (MDPC) codes based on protographs are
introduced and analyzed in the context of a McEliece-like
cryptosystem. The proposed ensembles significantly improve the
error correction capability of the regular MDPC code ensembles
that are currently considered for post-quantum cryptosystems
without increasing the public key size. The proposed ensembles
are analyzed in the asymptotic setting via density evolution, both
under the sum-product algorithm and a low-complexity (error-
and-erasure) message passing algorithm. The asymptotic analysis
is complemented at finite block lengths by Monte Carlo sim-
ulations. The enhanced error correction capability remarkably
improves the scheme robustness with respect to (known) decoding
attacks.
Index Terms—McEliece cryptosystem, moderate-density
parity-check codes, quasi-cyclic codes, information set decoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes [1] have been
recently proposed as underlying coding scheme for McEliece-
like cryptosystems [2], [3]. The family of MDPC codes admit
a parity-check matrix of moderate density1, yielding codes
with large minimum distance. In [2], a McEliece cryptosystem
based on quasi cyclic (QC)-MDPC codes that defeats informa-
tion set decoding attacks on the dual code due to the moderate
density parity-check matrix, is presented. For a given security
level, the QC-MDPC cryptosystem allows for very small key
sizes compared to other McEliece variants.
In this paper, we introduce a variation on the scheme of [2].
In particular, we investigate the adoption of MDPC ensembles
based on protographs [4] to improve the error correction
capability of the code underlying the cryptosystem. We focus
on protographs containing state variable nodes (VNs). The use
of state VNs allows designing codes that can be decoded over
an extended Tanner graph that is sparser than the reduced
Tanner graph associated with the code’s (moderate-density)
parity-check matrix.
For the introduced ensembles, we relate the density of the
extended Tanner graph to the density of the reduced Tanner
graph. The lower density of the extended Tanner graph allows
remarkable gains in terms of error correction capability with
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1The existence of a MDPC matrix for a binary linear block code does not
rule out the possibility that the same code fulfills a (much) sparser parity-
check matrix. As in most of the literature, we neglect the probability that a
code defined by a randomly-drawn moderate parity check matrix admits a
sparser parity-check matrix.
respect to the ensembles of [2]. The improvement is analyzed
both in the asymptotic setting via density evolution (DE) [5]
and at finite block length via Monte Carlo simulations, under
two decoding algorithms: The sum-product algorithm (SPA)
and the less complex Algorithm E from [5]. For one of the
proposed ensembles, a gain of 40% in the weight of error
patterns (decodable with a target error probability) is observed
with respect to the ensembles of [2], rendering the scheme
more resilient to information set decoding (ISD) attacks [6].
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Circulant Matrices
A binary circulant matrix A of size Q is a Q ˆ Q matrix
with coefficients in F2 obtained by cyclically shifting its first
row a “ pa0, a1, . . . , aQ´1q to the right, yielding
A “
¨˚
˚˝˚ a0 a1 ¨ ¨ ¨ aQ´1aQ´1 a0 ¨ ¨ ¨ aQ´2
...
...
. . .
...
a1 a2 ¨ ¨ ¨ a0
‹˛‹‹‚.
The set of QˆQ circulant matrices together with the matrix
multiplication and addition forms a commutative ring and it is
isomorphic to the polynomial ring
`
F2rXs{
`
XQ ´ 1˘ ,`, ¨˘.
In particular, we can associate to the circulant A a polynomial
apXq “ a0` a1X ` . . .` aQ´1xQ´1 P F2rXs. Consider two
Q ˆQ circulants A and B and their associated polynomials
apXq and bpXq. Denote by C “ A ` B and D “ AB.
Then, the circulants C and D are associated to the poly-
nomials cpXq “ apXq ` bpXq and dpXq “ apXq ¨ bpXq
mod
`
XQ ´ 1˘. We indicate the vector of coefficients of a
polynomial apXq as a “ pa0, a1, . . . , aQ´1q. The weight of
a polynomial apXq is the number of its non-zero coefficients.
We indicate both weights with the operator wht p¨q, i.e.,
wht papXqq “ wht paq.
B. QC-MDPC-based Cryptosystems
A binary MDPC code of length n, dimension k and row
weight dc is defined by a binary parity-check matrix H whose
rows have (moderate) Hamming weight dc. For n “ NQ,
dimension k “ KQ, redundancy2 m “MQ with M “ N´K
for some integer Q, the parity-check matrix HpXq of a QC-
MDPC code in polynomial form is a M ˆN matrix. Without
loss of generality we consider in the following codes with
M “ 1. This family of codes covers a wide range of code
2We assume here parity-check matrices without redundant rows.
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rates and is of particular interest for cryptographic applications
since the parity-check and generator matrices can be described
in a very compact way. The parity-check matrix of QC-MDPC
codes with M “ 1 has the form
HpXq “ `h0pXq h1pXq . . . hN´1pXq˘ . (1)
Let DECHp¨q be an efficient decoder for the code defined by
the parity-check matrix H . The cryptosystem operates in the
following manner.
1) Key Generation: The private key is generated as a parity-
check matrix of the form (1) with wht phipXqq “ dpiqc for
i “ 0, . . . , N . The matrix H with row weight dc “ řN´1i“0 dpiqc
is the private key. The public key is the corresponding binary
k ˆ n generator matrix G in systematic form3 (note that the
generator matrix can be described by KQ bits, yielding a small
public key size).
2) Encryption: To encrypt a plaintext u P Fk2 a user
computes the cyphertext c P Fn2 using the public key G
as c “ x` e where x “ uG and e is an error vector
uniformly chosen from all vectors from Fn2 of Hamming
weight wht peq “ e .
3) Decryption: To decrypt a cyphertext the authorized
recipient uses the private key to obtain xˆ “ DECHpcq. Since
G is in systematic form the plaintext corresponds (in case of
correct decoding) to the first k bits of xˆ.
C. Protograph-based Codes
A protograph P [4] is a small bipartite graph com-
prising a set of N0 VNs (also referred to as VN types)
tV0,V1, . . . ,VN0´1u and a set of M0 check nodes (CNs) (i.e.,
CN types) tC0,C1, . . . ,CM0´1u. A VN type Vj is connected
to a CN type Ci by bij edges. A protograph can be equivalently
represented in matrix form by an M0ˆN0 matrix B. The jth
column of B is associated to VN type Vj and the ith row of B
is associated to CN type Ci. The pi, jq element of B is bij . A
larger graph (derived graph) can be obtained from a protograph
by applying a copy-and-permute procedure. The protograph
is copied Q times, and the edges of the different copies are
permuted preserving the original protograph connectivity: If a
type-j VN is connected to a type-i CN with bij edges in the
protograph, in the derived graph each type-j VN is connected
to bij distinct type-i CNs (observe that multiple connections
between a VN and a CN are not allowed in the derived graph).
The derived graph is a Tanner graph with n0 “ N0Q VNs and
m0 “M0Q CNs that can be used to represent a binary linear
block code. A protograph P defines a code ensemble C . For
a given protograph P , consider all its possible derived graphs
with n0 “ N0Q VNs. The ensemble C is the collection of
codes associated to the derived graphs in the set.
Protographs allow specifying graphs which contain VNs
which are associated to codeword symbols, as well as VNs
which are not associated to codeword symbols. The latest class
of VNs are often referred to as state or punctured VNs. The
term “punctured” is used since the code associated with the
derived graph can be seen as a punctured version of a longer
3In [2] the use of a CCA2-secure conversion is proposed, which allows
using G in systematic-form without leaking information.
code associated with the same graph for which all the VNs
are associated to codeword bits. The introduction of state VNs
in a code graph allows designing codes with a remarkable
performance [7]. The QC-MDPC codes introduced in [2] admit
a protograph representation. In particular, for the rate 1{2 case,
the base matrix has the form
B “ ` b00 b01 ˘ . (2)
Here, N0 “ N “ 2 and M0 “ M “ 1. The expansion
of the protograph can be performed in a structured manner
yielding a QC-MDPC with parity-check matrix in polynomial
form HpXq “ ` h00pXq h01pXq ˘ with wht phijpXqq “
bij . In the remainder of the paper, we will focus on rate 1{2
codes, and we will denote the ensemble defined by (2) as the
reference ensemble or CA. In particular, we will consider as a
study case the shortest public key size considered in [2] for 80
bit security where Q “ 4801 is the public key size, and n “
9602 is the MDPC code block length. For this specific case,
the reference ensemble is obtained by setting b00 “ b01 “ 45
yielding a total row weight of 90. This choice of parameters
was introduced in [2] to obtain the security level of 80 bits.
D. Decoding Algorithms
Denote by v0, v1, . . . , vn0´1 the n0 VNs in the code Tanner
graph, and by c0, c1, . . . , cm0´1 then m0 CNs. The neigh-
borhood of a VN v is N pvq, and similarly N pcq denotes
the neighborhood of the CN c. The message from v to c is
denoted by mvÑc, and the message from c to v is denoted
by mcÑv. The channel message is mch. If a codeword bit is
associated to v (i.e., v is not a state VN), then we denote it
with a slight abuse of notation by x, with x “ `1 stands for
a 0 and x “ ´1 stands for a 1. The bit in the cyphertext
associated to x is c, with c “ ´x if an error is introduced,
c “ x otherwise. For state VNs, no cyphertext bits are pro-
duced at the encryption stage. We consider next two decoding
algorithms. The first algorithm is the classical SPA, for which
we introduce a generalization allowing an attenuation of the
extrinsic information produced at the CNs. As we shall see,
the attenuation can be used as a heuristic method to improve
the performance at low error rates. The second algorithm is
the Algorithm E introduced in [5], which reduces the decoding
complexity by limiting the message alphabet to the ternary set
t´1, 0,`1u. As observed in [5], Algorithm E benefits also
from the introduction of a heuristic scaling parameter. Here,
nevertheless, the parameter is used to amplify the channel
message, and it plays a role not only at low error rates, but
also in the so-called waterfall performance of the code. While
in [5] it was suggested to vary the scaling parameter with the
iteration number, here we will keep the scaling parameter fixed
throughout the iterations. In both cases, the scaling parameter
is indicated by ω.
1) Scaled Sum-Product Algorithm: The channel message is
initialized as
mch “ c ln n´ e
n
for the VNs associated to a cyphertext bit (recall that c “ ˘1
is the cyphertext bit), whereas mch “ 0 for the state VNs. At
the VNs,
mvÑc “ mch `
ÿ
c1PN pvqzc
mc1Ñv (3)
while at the CNs
mcÑv “ ω2 tanh´1
»– ź
v1PN pcqzv
tanh
´mv1Ñc
2
¯fifl (4)
with final decision, after iterating (3), (4) a given number of
times, given by
xˆ “ sign
»–mch ` ÿ
cPN pvq
mcÑv
fifl .
2) Algorithm E: The channel message is initialized as
mch “ c for the VNs associated to a cyphertext bit (recall
that c “ ˘1 is the cyphertext bit), whereas mch “ 0 for the
state VNs. At the VNs,
mvÑc “ sign
»–ωmch ` ÿ
c1PN pvqzc
mc1Ñv
fifl (5)
while at the CNs
mcÑv “
ź
v1PN pcqzv
mv1Ñc (6)
with final decision, after iterating (5), (6) a given number of
times, given by
xˆ “ sign
»–mch ` ÿ
cPN pvq
mcÑv
fifl .
Observe that the scaling parameter is de-activated (i.e., it is
set to 1) in the final decision.
III. PROTOGRAPH-BASED MDPC ENSEMBLES
We introduce next protograph-based MDPC ensembles
which make use of state VNs. For all the ensembles we adopt
a base matrix in the form
B “
ˆ
1 b01 b02
b10 b11 b12
˙
(7)
where the column on the left of the vertical delimiter is
associated to state VNs. The expansion of the protograph can
be performed in a structured manner yielding a QC-MDPC. In
particular, we first obtain a binary matrix in polynomial form
ΓpXq “
ˆ
1 γ01pXq γ02pXq
γ10pXq γ11pXq γ12pXq
˙
(8)
with wht pγijpXqq “ bij . The parity-check matrix is
HpXq “ ` h00pXq h01pXq ˘ (9)
with h00pXq “ rγ11pXq ` γ01pXqγ10pXqs mod pXQ ´ 1q
and h01pXq “ rγ12pXq ` γ02pXqγ10pXqs mod pXQ ´ 1q.
In this case, N0 “ 3 and M0 “ 2, yielding a Tanner graph
(associated with the matrix Γ) with n0 “ 3Q VNs. By
comparing with the block length n “ 2Q, one finds that the
code defined by (9) can be described as punctured version of
a longer code which has Γ as its parity-check matrix, where
the first Q bits in each codeword are punctured. The following
proposition established a relationship between the weights of
the rows of (8) and the weight of the rows of (9).
Proposition 1. The Hamming weight of each row of H is
upper bounded by b11 ` b01b10 ` b12 ` b02b10.
Proof. Follows by triangle’s inequality.
In the remainder of the paper, coefficients of the base matrix
are chosen such that upper bound given by Proposition 1
matches the weight of the rows of the parity check matrix of
the reference ensemble, i.e., b01b10` b11` b02b10` b12 “ 90.
The number of distinct matrices (8) with a base matrix of
the form (7), i.e. the number of different private keys in an
ensemble C, is
NpCq “ 1
Q
ˆ
Q
1
˙ź
i,j
ˆ
Q
bij
˙
“
ź
i,j
ˆ
Q
bij
˙
.
The size of the key space NpCq for different ensembles is given
in Table I. We provide next a DE analysis of protograph-based
ensembles.4
1) Sum-Product Algorithm: When the SPA is used, we
resort to quantized DE. We refer to [8] for the details.
The extension to protograph ensembles is straightforward and
follows the footsteps of [9], [10]. Simplified approaches based
on the Gaussian approximation are discarded due to the large
CN degrees [11] used by the MDPC code ensembles.
2) Algorithm E: In the following, we provide an extension
of the DE analysis of protograph ensembles for Algorithm
E, which was originally introduced in [5] for unstructured
ensembles. Rather than stating the complete DE, we sketch the
analysis by showing how message probabilities are updated at
VNs and CNs. Let us consider the transmission over a binary
symmetric channel (BSC) with error probability δ. We make
use of the conventional assumption of the all-zero codeword
transmission. It follows that all the message probabilities
derived next are conditioned to the transmission of a zero
value. Due to the mapping p0Ø `1, 1Ø ´1q at the decoder
input, we have that messages exchanged by VNs and CNs
take values in t´1, 0,`1u, whereas the messages associated
with the channel observations take values in t´ω, 0,`ωu. In
either case, 0 is the value associated with an erasure (which
replaces the channel observation in the case of a state VN). We
consider first a degree-d CN c of a given type. We assume the
CN to be connected to d VNs, each of different type (having
some VNs of the same type being a particular case). For ease
of notation, we assume the d VNs to be v0, v1, . . . , vd´1. At
a given iteration, we denote by qpiq` the probability that the
message from vi to c takes value `. Similarly, we denote by
4The codes that will be adopted in practice are QC, and hence represent a
sub-ensemble of the (larger) protograph-based MDPC ensemble. Anyhow, we
consider the results of the analysis as accurate in predicting the error correction
capability of the corresponding protograph-based QC-MDPC ensembles.
p
piq
` the probability that the message from c to vi takes value
`, after the CN elaboration. We have that
p
piq
´1 “
1
2
«ź
j‰i
´
q
pjq
`1 ` qpjq´1
¯
´
ź
j‰i
´
q
pjq
`1 ´ qpjq´1
¯ff
(10)
p
piq
0 “ 1´
ź
j‰i
´
1´ qpjq0
¯
(11)
p
piq
`1 “
1
2
«ź
j‰i
´
q
pjq
`1 ` qpjq´1
¯
`
ź
j‰i
´
q
pjq
`1 ´ qpjq´1
¯ff
. (12)
It follows that (10), (11) and (12) fully describe the evolution
of the message probabilities at the CNs. Let us consider now
a degree-d VN v of a given type. We assume the VN to be
connected to d CNs, each of different type (having some CNs
of the same type being a particular case). Again, for ease of
notation, we assume the d CNs to be c0, c1, . . . , cd´1. We shall
introduce next the probability vectors
ppiq :“
´
p
piq
´1, p
piq
0 , p
piq
`1
¯
qpiq :“
´
q
piq
´1, q
piq
0 , q
piq
`1
¯
.
Moreover, we introduce the channel message probability vec-
tor m :“ pm´ω,m´ω`1, . . . ,m`ωq with m0 “ 1 and m` “ 0
for all ` ‰ 0 if v is a state VN, whereas m´ω “ δ, m`ω “
1´ δ and m` “ 0 for all ` ‰ ˘ω otherwise. We introduce the
intermediate probability vector zpiq :“
”Æ
j‰i ppjq
ı
fm i.e.,
zpiq is the convolution of the probability vectors associated to
the messages at the input of v, with the exception of the one
received from ci. We have that
q
piq
´1 “
ÿ
`ă0
z
piq
` q
piq
0 “ zpiq0 qpiq`1 “
ÿ
`ą0
z
piq
` . (13)
Observe that (13) fully describe the evolution of the message
probabilities at the CNs. By iterating them with (10), (11) and
(12) for all VN/CN types specified by the protograph, one
can track the evolution of the message probabilities. Denote
by f “ pf´1, f0, f`1q the final a posteriori probability (APP)
estimate probability vector at v (obtained after a given number
of iterations). We have that
f´1 “
ÿ
`ă0
z` f0 “ z0 f`1 “
ÿ
`ą0
z`
with z :“
”Æ
j p
pjq
ı
fm1 and m1 :“ pm1´ 1,m10,m1` 1q and
m1´ 1 “ δ, m10 “ 0 and m1` 1 “ 1 ´ δ if v is not a state VN,
and m1´ 1 “ 0, m10 “ 1 and m1` 1 “ 0 otherwise. Successful
decoding convergence is declared if f´1 Ñ 0 and f0 Ñ 0 as
the iteration count tends to infinity, for all VN types.
3) Asymptotic Error Correction Capability Estimates: To
estimate the error correction capability of the ensembles under
consideration, we computed the iterative decoding threshold
over a BSC with error probability δ. The thresholds are
computed under the SPA and Algorithm E decoding. We
denote the former as δ‹SPA and the latter as δ‹E. Table I provides
the decoding threshold for some ensembles with base matrix in
the form (7), together with the reference ensemble from [2]. In
particular, we provide the products nδ‹SPA and nδ‹E as rough
estimates of the error correction capability of codes drawn
from ensembles with finite block length n, for the study case
TABLE I
THRESHOLDS COMPUTED FOR DIFFERENT PROTOGRAPHS, n “ 9602
Ensemble Base matrix NpCq nδ‹SPA pωq nδ‹E pωq
CA p45 45q 2715 113 p1q 57 p1q
112 p0.5q 106 p14q
CB
˜
1 8 8
5 5 5
¸
2328 132
25 p1q
57 p4q
CC
˜
1 22 22
2 1 1
¸
2446
171 p1q 43 p1q
155 p0.8q 128 p8q
of n “ 9602. The values represent a first estimate of the
maximum error pattern weights for which decoding succeeds
with high probability. The ensemble that exhibits the largest
iterative decoding threshold under both SPA and Algorithm
E decoding is ensemble CC. The gain in the weight of error
patterns (decodable with high probability) with respect to the
reference ensemble is here in the order of 50% under the SPA,
while under Algorithm E the gain reduces to 20%.
A. Error Correction Capability at Finite Length
Monte Carlo simulations have been performed to measure
the actual error correction capability of the codes with base
matrices in the form (7). In particular, for a given ensemble
and the given block length n “ 9602, QC-MDPC codes have
been obtained by expanding the base matrix with 4801ˆ4801
circulant matrices of suitable weight, with the circulants picked
uniformly at random. The results, in terms of block error rate
vs. weight of the error pattern, for the reference ensemble and
for the ensemble CC are depicted in Figure 1. The performance
measured with Algorithm E are in good accordance with the
gain predicted by the iterative decoding threshold analysis. At
a block error rate of 10´5 the code from CC allows operating
with around 20 errors more than what is allowed by the code
drawn from the reference ensemble.
Under SPA decoding, the codes drawn from both ensembles
showed performance curves with signs of slope change at
moderate-high error floors, preventing the achievement of low
block error rates with reasonably-high error pattern weights.
We conjecture that the reason for this behavior might be
found in the numerous trapping sets affecting the dense graphs
(recall that the code construction does not leverage on any
girth optimization technique, due to the need of generating the
private key uniformly at random). To mitigate this effect, we
made use of the attenuation parameter ω in (4) to reduce the
magnitude of the extrinsic estimated provided at the output of
the CNs.5 This heuristic approach turns out to be effective in
improving the error correction capability at low block error
rates. The choice of the scaling factors has been carried
out by searching via simulations the largest value of ω for
which no sign of error floor appears at a block error rate
greater than 10´5. Surprisingly, the use of a scaling parameter
ω “ 0.5 with codes from the reference ensemble allows
5The use of soft information scaling was used in a similar manner in [12]
to improve the performance of block turbo codes in the error floor region.
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Fig. 1. Block error rate for some codes from the ensembles CA and CC in
Table I. SPA (with and without scaling) and Algorithm E with 100 iterations.
attaining remarkable gain at low error rates without sacrificing
the waterfall region performance (the later result in accordance
with the DE analysis). For the code designed from ensemble
CC, the introduction of the scaling coefficient entails a visible
loss in the waterfall region (again, in accordance with the
DE analysis). We expect that a further optimization of the
algorithm (e.g., by allowing variable scaling coefficients across
iterations/edge types) may reduce the loss in the waterfall
region. Even accounting for the loss introduced by the scaling
coefficient, codes drawn from ensemble CC show gains in error
correction capability in order of 40% compared to CA.
IV. SECURITY
In this section we estimate the security level of the pro-
posed protograph-based MDPC McEliece cryptosystem. For
the analysis we use the pessimistic assumption that the system
is broken as soon as the QC-MDPC parity-check matrixHpXq
in (9) is reconstructed. This means that we assume that the
effort for obtaining the extended matrix ΓpXq (see (8)) from
HpXq is below the security level of the cryptosystem.
We denote by WFISDpn,m, eq the cost of decoding an
error pattern of Hamming weight e with a pn,mq linear
code (ISD is assumed here). The cost of distinguishing a
key, i.e. to recover one weight-dc row of the (sparse) parity
check matrix HpXq is denoted by WFdistpn,m, dcq. For the
QC case the cost of recovering the whole secret key equals
WFdistpn,m, dcq. We compute the work factors of the key dis-
tinguishing attack WFdistpn,m, dcq and the work factor for the
key recovery attack and the decoding attack WFdecpn,m, dcq
for the QC-MDPC McEliece cryptosystem according to [2,
Tab. 1], i.e., WFdistpn,m, dcq “WFISDpn, n´m, dcq{m and
WFdecpn,m, eq “WFISDpn,m, eq{?m. The work factor esti-
mates include the possible gains obtained by using the decode-
one-out-of-many approach [13]. We use the non-asymptotic
results from [14, Sec. 3.3] to estimate the work factor for
the May-Meurer-Thomae variant of ISD [15]. Consider the
QC-MDPC code ensemble CA for 80 bit security with n “
9602, k “ 4801, dc “ 90 from [2]. For decoding we consider
Algorithm E. The work factor for the key distinguishing attack
for CA and CC is WFdistp9602, 4801, 90q “ 280.6. Figure 1
shows that for CC we have a block error rate of 10´6 for
e « 102 whereas for CA we have e « 84. It follows that the
work factor of the decoding attack for ensemble is, according
to [2, Tab. 1], 281.0 for the reference ensemble, and 298.3 for
the scheme based on the ensemble CC.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Protograph-based moderate-density parity-check (MDPC)
code ensembles are introduced and analyzed in the context
of a McEliece-like cryptosystem. The proposed ensembles
significantly improve the error correction capability of the
MDPC code ensembles that are currently considered for post-
quantum cryptosystems, without increasing the public key size.
The enhanced error correction capability remarkably improves
the robustness with respect to decoding attacks.
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